In Retrospect

Case Histories in Medicine, Anthropology, and Science.

[Tutorial Proposal under construction]

This is a proposal for a joint research project into the comparative history of the trade of knowledge. By cultures of knowledge we mean to indicate those symbolic systems which make a claim to knowledge, whether universally applicable or only in some particular realm; hence the broad range of interest in philosophy, science, anthropology, medicine etc. The case histories presented by each researcher will address the appropriation, dissemination and evaluation of a particular set of knowledge.

The aims and results of this paper will be introduced and summarized jointly, while each sub-topic is expected to elucidate complementary aspects of the history of knowledge in a cross-cultural, geographically diffuse context.

This approach is expected to address questions about the history and nature of knowledge exchange as it pertains to cultural, practical, philosophical, individual, and institutional realms. ‘Western science,’ a loose term which is used in a general sense, will be considered as the primary agent engaged in knowledge exchange; its links to other systems of knowledge will be exposed to clarify the mutual insights and commensurabilities of global knowledge.

A number of questions will be addressed. For example, was the exchange of knowledge mainly harmonious or conflicted? How accurate was its translation? And what forms of authority were exercised at different points of contact? We will of course look at the Who, What, and Where, and the more interesting questions of How and Why to bind the cases together. The intellectual, economic, cultural, and spiritual aspects of the individual case studies will be used to elucidate historical pathways of knowledge transferral.

In the first case study, the historical interaction between Daoism, an ancient Chinese philosophy, and Quantum Mechanics, a twentieth century science, will be investigated. Commensurabilities between these cultures of knowledge were sought and found by modern scientists, leading to popular literature and individual convictions about the practical significance of modern science from a philosophical (if not spiritual) point of view.

The second case study will discuss the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Dutch VOC traders in East Asia as far as their exchange of medical knowledge was concerned. Rich traditions of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ medicine came into contact and eventually led to mutual enrichment in cultures of knowledge. How exactly did this occur? As we shall see, a unique combination of practical investments and theoretical research would lead to new insights into the science of human medicine.

Finally, the third case study is concerned with the science of anthropology in the mid twentieth century. Margaret Mead’s field work in Samoa is the point of departure, where we have a western scientist doing field work in a non-Western culture. What did she learn, and how did she transfer and translate her knowledge to American anthropology and culture? What was her role as an authority on Samoan culture? A historical and comparative study will be able to elucidate the intricate web of knowledge production and development.

As it stands, we want to provide a decentralized notion of knowledge production in the history of western science; not one time, one place, or one method defines science, rather a flowing together of multiple streams of ideas and practices in various places and times. The dynamic processes which connect cultures of knowledge need to be recognized as such. As a comparative study we have several limiting factors to consider, in our choice of what is to be compared, but also from what perspective the comparison is to be undertaken. We therefore expect the different case studies together will provide a more objective and nuanced perception than if they had been presented separately.

Filed under: History of the Biomedical Sciences, History of the Natural Sciences, History of the Social Sciences

Central in Steven Pinker’s The Blank Slate are three philosophical doctrines that would have dominated 20th century psychology: empiricism (the Blank Slate), romanticism (the Noble Savage), and dualism (the Ghost in the Machine).

In “An Essay concerning Human Understanding” (1690), John Locke argued that all reason and knowledge is derived from sense-experience. Everyone would be born with a blank mind, except for a few basic instincts. Locke’s empiricism would have significant social implications. The doctrine would undermine hereditary royalty and aristocracy as well as the institution of slavery, as both groups could neither be considered innately inferior nor superior; rather, all are equal. From this point, Pinker showed by results from cognitive neuroscience that innate mechanisms exist in the genetically determined brain and that therefore the Blank Slate is incorrect. Pinker forgot, however, that Locke never denied the existence of human nature. Every human has basic instincts, innate properties, and sense organs to be able to obtain knowledge about the world. Pinker’s assumption that the Blank Slate and human nature exclude each other is therefore incorrect.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau claimed that civilisation corrupts the fundamental goodness of human nature. The ill effects could be moderated by active participation in democratic consensual politics. In other words, Rousseau claimed that ideas about good and evil, right and wrong, are social constructions that form the conscience of the individual. This 18th century romanticism continues to be influential, as it provides an argument in favour of anything natural and against anything artificial. Showing results from evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and behavioural genetics, Pinker argued that humans are not peaceful, but in fact, have and can inherit brain mechanisms associated with aggression, violence, and mental illness. But do these results really contradict Rousseau’s doctrine? Rousseau merely showed that nurture influences how the conscience of humans is shaped, and Pinker showed that nature can also influence the either good or bad behaviour of people. Moreover, Pinker’s anthropological argument that conflicts and wars are human affairs in all cultures only seems to support Rousseau’s.

The oldest doctrine is dualism by René Descartes, who regarded the domain of reality in terms of two independent principles: the mind and body. Although the body is subject to mechanical laws, the mind or soul would be free, indivisible, and will survive the death of the body. The term “Ghost in the Machine” was coined by Gilbert Ryle, who, like Pinker, attempted to undermine Descartes’ ideas on mind and matter, which gained wide appeal nonetheless. This dualist idea underwent the supposedly contradictory results from cognitive neuroscience as presented by Pinker. Emotions, motives, and goals can be understood in terms of cybernetics, namely mechanisms of feedback and control. Pinker showed that all human experiences, thoughts, and emotions correspond to physiological activity, electrical impulses, in the tissues of the brain. But does that mean that all is biological? There still are physical and mental processes that have both mental and mechanical causes. Indeed, certain behaviour is caused by physical causes, but people can be mentally ill whereas they are physically fine. Pinker’s argument therefore only proofs that one should not separate mind from body as extremely as Descartes might have done.

Pinker, S., The Blank Slate. The Modern Denial of Human Nature. New York: Penguin Books, 2002.

Filed under: History of the Social Sciences

Summary by Dirk and Ruben of Theodore M. Porter's "The Death of the Object: Fin de siècle Philosophy of Physics," in D. Ross (ed.), Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences, 1994.

Porter attempts to describe how science obtained the adjectives that it has today, namely impersonal, univocal, and authoritative. With the conception of "the death of the object," Porter wants to illustrate that descriptionism (see Heilbron) was not a defensive turn from realism in a period of crisis in physics, but an optimistic and positivist attempt to define science to encompass both physical and mental phenomena, while introducing an universal scientific method. It made knowledge a matter of convention and boundaries seem artificial, not to exalt subjectivity, but to increase certainty. He illustrates this by Ernst Mach and Carl Pearson, while putting them in the historical context of late nineteenth century physics.

In the late nineteenth century realism was questioned. Time, space, force etc. were concepts which gradually descended from their absolute realist position to a position of conventionalism. Description started replacing causal explanation. By giving up metaphysics and relying instead on mathematical description, physical theory was to become like pure mathematics.

Ernst Mach (1838-1916) argued that scientific knowledge was economical and consisted of the connection of appearances. Its ultimate product was not the knowledge itself, but control. No distinction could be made between subject and object, therefore scientific claims could be about physical objects as well as human actors. The common basis of all knowledge lay in the immediacy of experience. According to Mach, human intimacy with nature permitted successful science. Max Planck, however, found it imperative that the outside world was something independent from man, something absolute. Mach's denial of real objects in physics was held up as the foundation for objective knowledge in the human sciences.

Carl Pearson (1857-1936) was a Neo-Machian, according to Porter. He also insisted on a unified science encompassing more than the physical world, yet went further in his development of a scientific method and its uses. For Carl Pearson, science knew no limits and he defied the traditional boundaries of politics, religion, and even the human skin. His scientific method consisted of the classification of facts, the comparison of their relationships, and finally the discovery of a formula or scientific law. The scientific method could help solve social problems. Because everybody could learn this method it required no more than good education to obtain good citizens. Individuality was sacrificed for the public good.

Porter shows how science expanded beyond all limits by associating itself with appearances. The death of the object resulted in the disintegration of the subject, resulting in the possibility of universal experience, consensus and an quantification and objectification of knowledge. Late nineteenth century philosophy of physics was not in a crisis, but resonated in a wider culture yielding an increase of certainty. Mach’s adoption of the principle of economy and the influence of Pearson on the Social Sciences through statistics illustrates the cross-fertilization between the different disciplines.

Remarks and criticism

According to Porter, descriptionism was an optimistic attempt. The ‘revolt against positivism’ is almost neglected in the paper, while the role of the positivists is exemplified. Naturally, a crisis in physics is absent in scientists with a optimistic, exuberant view of physics. His sources and perspective defined the outcome of his question. A stronger case would have been to include more examples of confident scientists in the late nineteenth century, who were oblivious to a crisis. Porter, furthermore, does not illustrate an ‘efflorescence of competing conceptions of the proper foundations of physics’. Also, the example of Boltzmann can hardly be seen as unproblematic for physics. Michelson’s ‘remarkable complacency’ in precise measurement is not convincing either. Nineteenth century thought moved away from ontological realism to relational conventionalism, why change if there was no crisis? Furthermore, offence may be the best defense.

How do Fechner’s and Mach’s psychophysics and monism as holistic principles relate to scientific knowledge understood as to economize on thought, the disregarding nature except insofar as humans interact with it, and Mach’s razor? Is Pearson’s rigid scientific method not a narrowing down and reduction of our knowledge?

How to practice psychophysics, Mach does not give us a scientific method, nor a political use of his theory. Does that make his monism unconvincing, yet politically and ethically, regarding Pearson, admirable?

Pearson does not make a classification of the material of science. He does not apply his own method to the field of science. Is this an insuperable objection to his view on science?  

Why is measuring essential to descriptionism, and does it really remove sources of controversy?

Filed under: History of the Social Sciences, Science and Dilemma's of Modernity

Hey guys, don't forget: for this Monday we have to read "Introduction" and "Chapter 1: France." The course History, Role & Impact of the Social Sciences hasn't even started yet, or we have to read 100 pages!

Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology. "The theme of this book is the conflict that arose in the early 19th century between the literary and scientific intellectuals of Europe, as they competed for recognition as the chief analysts of the new industrial society in which they lived. Sociology was conceived as the 3rd major discipline, a hybrid of the scientific and literary traditions. The author chronicles the rise of the new discipline by discussing the lives and works of the most prominent thinkers of the time, in England, France, and Germany. The book presents a penetrating study of idealists grappling with reality when industrial society was in its infancy."

Filed under: History of the Social Sciences